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FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPTS TO GUIDE POLITICS AND POLICY

America Is a Republic,
Not a Democracy
Bernard Dobski

A

merica is a republic and not a pure democracy. The contemporary
efforts to weaken our republican customs and institutions in the
name of greater equality thus run against the efforts by America’s Founders to
defend our country from the potential excesses of democratic majorities. American republicanism and the ordered liberty it makes possible are grounded in
the Federalists’ recognition that non-majoritarian parts of the community
make legitimate contributions to the community’s welfare, and that preserving these contributions is the hallmark of political justice. But, the careful
balance produced by our mixed republic is threatened by an egalitarianism
that undermines the social, familial, religious, and economic distinctions and
inequalities that undergird our political liberty. Preserving the republican
freedoms we cherish requires tempering egalitarian zeal and moderating the
hope for a perfectly just democracy.
Contrary to popular belief, America is not, nor was it meant to be, a pure
democracy. America is a republic. Nevertheless, more and more voices today
are calling for America to become a direct democracy.
A 2017 Pew Research survey found that 67 percent of those Americans
polled considered a system in which citizens voted directly on “major
national issues” to be a good thing.1 The National Citizens Initiative
for Democracy, sponsored by former Senator Mike Gravel (D–AK) and
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endorsed by the likes of Noam Chomsky and the late Howard Zinn, calls
for direct democracy through the creation of an independent “Legislature
of the People,” which would allow American citizens to amend the Constitution directly and pass laws of their own choosing, bypassing both state
and federal legislatures in the process. Tom Steyer, in his bid to become
the Democratic presidential nominee, called for something similar. In the
spirit of ever more democracy, he advocated the use of national referenda
on two major policy debates a year and repeatedly attacked the Electoral
College as undemocratic.2
Indeed, the calls to abolish or circumvent the Electoral College in the
selection of our chief executive represent the most visible sign of this
democratic antipathy to our republican institutions. Senator Brian Schatz
(D–HI), who introduced a bill to abolish the Electoral College, described
it as “undemocratic and radical,” and called eliminating it “an unassailably
logical evolution of our Constitution.”3
Similar hostility to the pillars of our republic in the name of more democracy is found across our political landscape: in the way many states rely
on ballot initiatives to effect public policy; in the hostility to procedural
limits that inhibit Congressional majorities from having their way; and
in the increased dissatisfaction with the efficiency and responsiveness of
our deliberative political institutions.4 As a result, there is an increased
interest in non-republican “solutions” to any obstacles to more democracy,
whether it be endorsing Congressional term-limits, scrapping the Senatorial

1.

Richard Wike, Kate Simmons, Bruce Stokes, and Janell Fetterolf, “Globally, Broad Support for Representative and Direct Democracy,” Pew Research
Center, October 16, 2017, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2017/10/16/democracy-widely-supported-little-backing-for-rule-by-strong-leader-ormilitary/#many-publics-want-a-direct-say (accessed April 4, 2020).

2.

Ben Christopher, “Tom Steyer Wants to Fix American Politics by Making it Californian,” CalMatters, July 11, 2019, https://calmatters.org/blogs/californiaelection-2020/2019/07/tom-steyer-presidential-bid-california-ideas-for-country-politics-direct-democracy/ (accessed April 4, 2020).

3.

Such a view seems to be a prerequisite for leading Democrats. Many of those Democrats who recently sought their party’s presidential nomination
made the abolition of the Electoral College, in the name of greater equality, a formal part of their platforms. Explaining his opposition to the Electoral
College, Senator Bernie Sanders (D–VT) said “[i]t is hard to defend a system in which we have a president who lost the popular vote by three million
votes.” Alexandra Hutzler, “Bernie Sanders Joins Effort to Abolish Electoral College: ‘We Have a President Who Lost the Popular Vote by 3 Million Votes’,”
Newsweek, July 12, 2019, https://www.newsweek.com/bernie-sanders-abolish-electoral-college-1448949 (accessed April 3, 2020). Senator Elizabeth
Warren (D–MA) opposed it on the grounds that “[e]veryone’s vote should count equally—in every election—no matter where they live…your power in our
democracy shouldn’t be determined by where you live.” “I just think this is how a democracy should work,” Warren claimed. Warren Democrats, “Get Rid
of the Electoral College,” Warren Democrats, March 19, 2019, https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/electoral-college (accessed April 3, 2020). The movement
to circumvent the Electoral College enjoys increased momentum with the spread of the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC) that seeks to
“equalize [individuals’] votes among states across the country.” According to John Koza, the chairman of the NPVIC, under its plan “[e]very vote of every
voter in every state would count directly towards the presidential candidate that voter wants see to be president, so it would make every voter in every
state equal.” Tess Bonn, “Leader Behind Popular Vote Initiative Says Plan Will Make Every Voter ‘Equal’,” The Hill, March 11, 2019, https://thehill.com/hilltv/
rising/433498-leader-behind-national-popular-vote-initiative-says-plan-will-help-equalize (accessed April 4, 2020).

4.

Yascha Mounk, “America is Not a Democracy: How the United States Lost the Faith of Its Citizens—and What It Can Do to Win Them Back,” The
Atlantic, March 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/03/america-is-not-a-democracy/550931/ (accessed March 30, 2020).
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filibuster, expanding the number of justices on the U.S. Supreme Court, or
developing more effective and immediate ways to express the will of the
majority, such as quadratic, ranked-choice, and digital voting—anything
to liberate more fully the direct will of the people.
America’s Founders carefully thought through the problems of direct
democracy and explicitly rejected this model—and for good reason. They
saw that because ancient democracies lacked any social or institutional
forces that could check, refine, or moderate the will of the majority, they
were prone to great instability, riven by factionalism, and subject to the
passions and short-sightedness of the public. Direct democracies were thus
vulnerable to tyranny.
American republicanism, by contrast, offers protections from the instability, rashness, impetuosity, and social and political tyranny of democratic
politics because it recognizes that the majority does not equal the whole of
the community. Republicanism recognizes the valid contributions to the
welfare of the community by non- and even counter-majoritarian parts of
the community. Indeed, justice demands that, even in a nation rooted in
popular consent, non- and counter-majoritarian forces must be blended
together. In this way, republicanism protects the minority from unjust
majorities and secures the conditions for the political and social freedoms
that are the true goal of the American revolution.
But this is not all. As Tocqueville correctly foresaw, the limitless passion
for equality—the root cause for seeking direct democracy—undermines
respect for all of those social, familial, civic, and religious institutions
that separate individuals from one another, establish hierarchies, dictate
codes of behavior, and, most importantly, help us preserve our liberties.
To advocates, this pursuit of ever more equality represents a panacea, a
“one-size-fits-all” solution, to the various political conflicts we face. In
promoting greater equality, they would impose a single, uniform view of
justice upon a republican order built on the recognition that the political
community is more than just the majority of its citizens. Our republic
is built on the recognition that no single part of the community has a
monopoly on justice. Genuine political justice therefore requires tending
to the legitimate needs and contributions of a community’s non-majoritarian elements and preserving the social, familial, civic, and religious
practices that define them. Given the importance of such practices to
human flourishing, the recovery of republicanism means the recovery of
our humanity.

June 2020 | 3

FIRST PRINCIPLES | No. 80
heritage.org



June 2020 | 4

Republics, Not Democracies
The effort to recover an appreciation of our republican character must
first confront the fact that for most Americans the two terms have become
indistinguishable, each signifying the same thing: government by popular
consensus.5 But while a republic draws on the people for its legitimacy, it
does not valorize the majority or identify the majority with the whole of
the political community.
The political institutions peculiar to republicanism derive from the
insight that there is more to the health and well-being of a political community than the wishes of the majority of its citizens. Americans today confuse
republicanism with democracy because they have forgotten, and our educators no longer remind them of, the non- and even counter-majoritarian
rationale for our distinctive political institutions. Of course, this amnesia
about republicanism is not simply due to non-existent or ineffective civics
curricula. Its underlying cause is an insatiable love of democracy that seeks
to apply its egalitarian principle to the family, education, social and religious
life, and finally to the norms, practices, and institutions that define who we
are as a republic.
Those who demand that we become more democratic forget that for the
better part of the Western political tradition, republicanism, not democracy,
served as the model of political health and excellence. Indeed, up until the
beginning of the 19th century, European nations and their leaders viewed
the republics of ancient Sparta and Rome, and not democratic Athens,
as models worthy of emulation. This preference for republicanism over
and against democracy was especially pronounced in America’s Founding political documents and in the numerous writings that justified and
explained them. The word “democracy” is found neither in the Declaration
of Independence nor in our Constitution. The term “republic,” however,
does appear in the Constitution.6
This preference for republicanism over democracy stems largely from
the fact that ancient democracies, rooted in popular consent, were also vulnerable to the passions and shortsightedness of popular rule. Thus, Madison
writes, lamenting the popular governments of the ancient world:
5.

Ryan McMaken, “Stop Saying ‘We’re a Republic, Not a Democracy’,” Mises Wire, November 3, 2017, https://mises.org/wire/stop-saying-were-republicnot-democracy (accessed March 15, 2020). McMaken’s argument rests on the fallacy that the mere existence of representative institutions is sufficient
for a modern democracy to qualify as a republic in the sense our Founders intended. But if republican institutions have been coopted to serve
purely democratic purposes, as they have been in many European countries, then they no longer serve their intended non- and counter-majoritarian
functions. As such, they cease to be republican.

6.

United States Constitution, Article IV, sec. 4.
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[it] is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy
without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which
they were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions by
which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration between the extremes
of tyranny and anarchy. If they exhibit occasional calms, these only serve as
short-lived contrasts to the furious storms that are to succeed. If now and
then intervals of felicity open to view, we behold them with a mixture of regret,
arising from the reflection that the pleasing scenes before us are soon to be
overwhelmed by the tempestuous waves of sedition and party rage. If momentary rays of glory break forth from the gloom, while they dazzle us with a
transient and fleeting brilliancy, they at the same time admonish us to lament
that the vices of government should pervert the direction and tarnish the luster
of those bright talents and exalted endowments for which the favored soils
that produced them have been so justly celebrated.7

These governments were tumultuous because they supplied no check on
the people. They had no mediating institutions that could filter or delay the
majority’s impulses. For instance, during the Peloponnesian War between
Athens and Sparta (431 BC–404 BC), the Athenian assembly voted in favor
of Alcibiades’ outrageously daring plan to conquer Sicily. This plan, on its
own, would prove tremendously risky for the Athenians for numerous
reasons, not the least of which was that the massive expedition, despite
being sumptuously outfitted, still lacked the cavalry forces necessary to
counter those of their enemies because the oligarchic elements in the city,
who would normally be counted on to contribute the requisite horses and
knights, silently opposed the campaign. And they were silent in their opposition because they feared for their lives and their property in the face of
the democratic mania for the expedition.8 Without a voice in the assembly
to represent vigorously the interests of the oligarchic faction, the Athenian
demos (the majority) was allowed to proceed under the mistaken belief that
their particular wishes and views represented the entirety of the city. Had
the Athenian assembly employed representation, with the protection of
diverse views that it entails, the wisdom of the oligarchic faction might
have saved the city from the catastrophic defeat to which its democratic
ignorance subsequently doomed it.

7.

James Madison, The Federalist No. 9, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed09.asp (accessed April 13, 2020).

8.

For an account of this assembly, see Book 6, chaps. 7 through 26 in The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to The Peloponnesian War,
edited by Robert B. Strassler with an introduction by Victor Davis Hanson (New York: Free Press, 1996).
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Ancient democracies like Athens, what Madison calls “pure” democracies,
could engage in this kind of behavior because they guaranteed in principle
the right of each citizen to exercise directly the powers of government. As
Madison states, “in a democracy, the people meet and exercise the government in person; in a republic, they assemble and administer it by their
representatives and agents. A democracy, consequently, will be confined
to a small spot.”9 Again, the test case for this is democratic Athens. There
the largest power was the assembly (ekklessia) in which some 30,000 male
citizens were entitled to participate. It was in this body that the citizens
of Athens deliberated over and passed laws regarding peace, war, empire,
citizenship, and taxes. Of course, the Pnyx, the small open-air, rocky outcropping where the assembly met, could only hold around 6,000 citizens.
But every 10 days, these 6,000 citizens would gather to consider an agenda
that had been prepared for it by an elected council of 500 citizens (boule),
each of whom served terms of one year. Individual citizens were allowed to
come forward in the assembly and either propose motions on the basis of
the agenda supplied by the council or deliver speeches advocating, modifying, or contesting them.10 There were no procedural rules either for these
speeches or for the behavior of the audience, which meant that assembly
meetings could get raucous and violent depending on both the particular
speaker and the mood of fellow citizens.11 In the end, the majority’s will on
matters of state was registered through a raised-hand vote, with the outcome depending on the persuasiveness of a particular speaker, which may
have flowed from his particular rhetorical gifts, his personal reputation, or
his ability to direct the passions of his listeners.
The decisions rendered by such an assembly were absolute and there
was no higher authority governing it. They were not even bound by precedent; the assembly could undo in one meeting what it had decreed the
week before. With no outside authority to check their judgments, these
6,000 Athenians were free to make and act on whatever fickle or dangerous

9.

James Madison, The Federalist No. 14, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed14.asp (accessed April 13, 2020). In an earlier formulation, Madison
defines a pure democracy as “a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person.” James
Madison, The Federalist No. 10, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed10.asp (accessed April 13, 2020).

10. The only public officials present in the assembly were there to oversee the ritual sacrifices that opened the assembly and to ensure the orderly
selection of speakers and the recording of votes. But these were different for each meeting and possessed no real formal powers. For a general
overview of the structure and operation of Athenian democracy, see Alan L. Boegehold’s brief chapter “The Athenian Government in Thucydides” in
The Landmark Thucydides, pp. 577–582.
11. Informed by such an insight, Madison could thus write in The Federalist No. 55 that “[i]n all very numerous assemblies, of whatever characters
composed, passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates; every Athenian assembly would still have
been a mob.” James Madison, The Federalist No. 55, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed55.asp (accessed April 13, 2020).
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decisions.12 And make them they did, whether it was the decision to execute some of their generals for failing to collect the wrecks of shipwrecked
sailors after the victory at Arginusae (406 BC),13 or the decision to kill all
the adult males of the rebellious city of Mytilene (427 BC), (a decision that
they revoked the next day).14 Madison may thus have had more than the
Athenians’ execution of Socrates in mind when, in describing the fickleness
of their assembly, he noted that these citizens were free to decree hemlock
for some of their citizens one day and erect statues to them the next.15
Athens was the freest of the ancient Greek city-states. But without the
necessary checks afforded by republican institutions to protect the city from
its majoritarian vices, this unbounded democracy produced a history filled
with factional strife, revolution, regime change, political murder, and, in
some cases, tyranny. The reasons for this are simple. In such a democracy,
writes Madison, a
common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of
the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government
itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker
party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever
been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general
been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.16

In this society, once the people’s passions have been agitated, there is
little that can be done to extinguish them.
A republic mitigates these difficulties because, while it is literally a “thing
of the people,” it is not a “thing of the many.” In other words, this “thing
of the people” could only become synonymous with “the commonwealth”
because it deliberately incorporates into its constitution the voices and
interests of all of the various parts that make it up, and thus the many and
the few, the rich and the poor, the educated and the unlettered, and the
soldiers, craftsmen, and farmers. By doing so, it implicitly concedes that
12. Writing two millennia later on the dangers of this kind of unchecked majoritarian rule, Tocqueville observes that “to give all power to the majority
that represents the people...is the language of a slave.” “As for me,” Tocqueville, continues, “I cannot believe it; and the power to do everything that
I refuse to any one of my fellows, I will never grant to several.” Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, edited by Eduardo Nolla and trans. by
James T. Schleifer (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2012), Vol. 1, Part 2, chap. 7, p. 411.
13. See The Landmark Xenophon’s Hellenika, Robert B. Strassler, ed., and trans. by John Marincola (New York: Free Press, 2010), Book 1, chaps. 6 and 7.
14. The Landmark Thucydides, Book 3, chaps. 36 and 49.
15. James Madison, The Federalist No. 63, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed63.asp (accessed April 13, 2020).
16. James Madison, The Federalist No. 10, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed10.asp (accessed April 13, 2020).
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the interests of the many, while important, are not simply the same as the
common good; for a republic, securing the common good reflects the proper
balance of these distinctive and, at times, competing elements of the political community as dictated by political justice.
Republics can bring together these potentially discordant voices because
they, unlike direct democracies, employ the principle of representation.
Thus, in Federalist No. 39, when Madison defines a republic, he stresses that
it can, but need not, be directly dependent on the consent of the governed.
A republic is:
a government which derives all of its powers directly or indirectly from the
great body of the people, and is administered, for a limited period, or during
good behavior. It is essential to such a government that it be derived from the
great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored
class of it…. It is sufficient for such a government that the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people.17

This recourse to representation makes it possible for modern republics
to govern vast territories and large populations (conditions essential to
the preservation of civil liberty), which will be explored more fully below.
What needs to be stressed here is that by insisting on representation in
the American scheme, Madison concedes that popular rule cannot by itself
secure ordered liberty under the law. For Madison and his fellow Federalists,
neither government nor society should be reducible to the will of the majority; “majority” does not equal “all.” Nor does it always equal “good.” Madison
and Hamilton both knew that to preserve public goods like internal stability
and political liberty, non- or even counter-majoritarian political bodies
are necessary to preserve the republic from its worst vices. Or, as Martin
Diamond puts it, the Founders wanted to make the republic decent despite
its being democratic.18
In the principle of representation then, our Founders identified a
kind of power that draws authority from the people while being able to
act independently of and against their majoritarian excesses. Properly
structured, representative bodies will refine and enlarge the views of their

17. James Madison, The Federalist No. 39, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed39.asp (accessed April 13, 2020).
18. Diamond’s statement, drawn from his essay “The Revolution of Sober Expectations,” bears quoting in full: “Contrary to our too complacent modern
perspective regarding democracy, which assumes that a government cannot be decent unless democratic, our Founding Fathers, skeptically, sensibly,
and soberly were concerned how to make this government decent even though democratic.” Martin Diamond, As Far as Republican Principles Will
Admit: Essays by Martin Diamond (Lanham, MD: American Enterprise Institute, 1992), p. 220 (italics in the original).
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constituents, apply a brake to their impetuous decisions, inject reason into
their impassioned debates, and, when necessary, make far-sighted, if unpopular, decisions with a view to the public good.19 Crafting such an institution
reflects more than practical political wisdom; it requires a sober assessment
of the limits to what can be justly achieved in political life.
The “Mixed” Republic of Aristotle. Madison looked to the most
famous republic in Western political history for historical evidence supporting this sober assessment. The Roman Republic’s successful mixture of
monarchic, aristocratic, and democratic elements was the product of a long
and often bloody experience, depicted especially in the works of Livy and
Polybius.20 But the theoretical justification of a regime that incorporates
monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy can be credited to ancient Greek
thought, especially as found in Aristotle’s Politics.
Aristotle explicitly addresses the constitutional make-up of this “mixed
regime” (or what he terms a “polity”) in Book 4 of The Politics. But he provides the theoretical justification for such a regime at the end of Book 3.21
According to Aristotle, all cities are made up of at least two factions, the
“democrats” who are numerous but poor, and the “oligarchs,” who are few
but rich. Virtually all domestic political conflict can be reduced to the clash
between these two parties. This is because both factions claim to deserve
to rule their community on the ground that they contribute most to the
welfare of the community: the democrats because they contribute their
lives and liberty to the defense of the community through service in the
infantry and the navy, and the oligarchs because their wealth helps the city’s
economy, religious observance, and military defense thrive.
It is important to stress that, for Aristotle, both parties advance these
claims on the basis of justice. This conflict over rule is not merely a power
grab, nor is it just an economic squabble between the haves and have-nots.22
The democrats and oligarchs make claims to rule on the basis of their
superior justice because they understand political rule to be a great honor
19. On the virtues of such a representative body, Tocqueville writes, that “it is sufficient for the popular will to pass through this chosen assembly in order,
in a sense, to be transformed and to emerge clothed in more noble and more beautiful forms. So the men elected in this way always represent the
governing majority of a nation; but they represent only the elevated thoughts that circulate in its midst, the generous instincts that animate it, and not
the small passions that often trouble it and the vices that dishonor it.” Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 321.
20. Titus Livy, The History of Rome: Books 1–5, trans. and introduction by Valerie M. Warrior (Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing Company, 2006) and
Polybius The Histories, trans. by Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). See especially Book 6, chap. 5, for Polybius’s famous
discussion of the mixed character of Rome’s republican constitution.
21. Aristotle, The Politics, trans. and introduction by Carnes Lord (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013).The following discussion is based on chaps.
8–11 of Book 3.
22. In Book 2, chap. 7, of The Politics, Aristotle famously claims that no man becomes a tyrant simply to come in from the cold. Men, in other words, do not
run the risks to life and limb frequently involved in political conflict simply to ensure that they have relish for their meats or slaves to draw a hot bath.
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and that to be denied political rights is a profound insult, the equivalent of
reducing one to a slave. The fact that this dispute is over the just basis of
political rule is what makes factional conflict so difficult to resolve. Madison
knew this well. “Justice,” he wrote, “is the end of government. It is the end
of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained,
or until liberty be lost in the pursuit.”23
Precisely because the democrats and oligarchs understand political rule
to be an honor and the political community to be a human association that is
noble and worthy of our greatest devotion, political life has to be something
larger or more dignified than a mere military alliance (as defined by the
democratic view) or a business partnership (as defined by the oligarchic
view). The claim to rule most consistent with the view of political life as a
matter of dignity and honor is that put forward by human beings of great
moral and intellectual virtue. After all, the rule of moral and intellectual
virtue ennobles the community. Their virtue would allow them to produce
the genuine well-being of others and the example of virtuous rulers provides
a model for others to follow, making citizens more just human beings. Thus,
working from the claims of the rich and the poor, Aristotle arrives at the rule
of one man, or a select group of men, on the basis of their outstanding virtue.
But as Aristotle also knew, political power could not be justifiably limited
to such a tiny cabal, not only because such a group would be too small to
protect itself from its subjects or from foreign enemies (which it would)
or because the wealthy and the poor, denied the honor of political rights,
would refuse to contribute their wealth and numbers to the needs of the
city (which they would), but because denying them a meaningful role in the
political order would be unjust. And it would be unjust precisely because the
rule of virtue by itself is insufficient; it needs the goods that the wealthy and
the people provide in order to achieve its ends. This means that incorporating the wealthy and the people into the regime is not simply a concession
to the strength conferred by their superior wealth and numbers. Incorporating the wealthy and the people into the same regime reflects the insight
that political justice is a compound thing, made up of distinct and, at times,
competing interests. And it reflects the view that while all factions within
a political community understand themselves to be pursuing justice, they
each of them speak of or seek only a part of justice.
This recognition that no one faction has a monopoly on justice offers a
useful corrective to those who think that more equality and more democracy are the panaceas for whatever might ail us, and who thus try to weaken
23. James Madison, The Federalist No. 51, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed51.asp (accessed April 13, 2020).
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the republican protections of our freedom so that they can impose on
everyone else their uniform view of justice. Recognizing that parties only
speak to a part of justice means acknowledging the legitimate existence of
rival factions that may well speak to another part of justice. It means recognizing that rival factions may make genuine contributions to the welfare
of the community and should therefore not be demonized as enemies to
be eliminated.24 And it means learning to embrace moderation, that art
of self-limitation so crucial to the responsible exercise of political liberty.
Of course, to make all of this possible, the political means through which
one can bring together in one government the representatives of necessary, but
often antagonistic, elements of the community in a way that preserves the goods
they make possible while tempering the vices to which they are prone must
be discovered. This discovery is the specific genius of the American Founders.
America’s “Mixed” Republic. Like Aristotle, Madison and Hamilton
understood why incorporating contentious forces within our political institutions was such a necessity: Both political reality, which is characterized by
diverse interests, and the demands of political justice, which is not a simple
but a compound thing, mandate it. Madison acknowledged the difficulties
inherent in effecting such incorporation, specifically of combining “the
requisite stability and energy in government, with the inviolable attention
due to liberty and to the republican form.” It is difficult to combine them
“together in their due proportions” because the:
genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side, not only that all
power should be derived from the people, but that those intrusted with it
should be kept in dependence on the people, by a short duration of their appointments; and that even during this short period the trust should be placed
not in a few, but a number of hands.25

And yet, on the other side, the political stability and energy a republic
needs require its representatives to enjoy significant independence from
the wills of the people. They also require the agents responsible for such
stability and energy to be few in number.

24. In a recent piece on the place of Islam in France today, Pierre Manent highlights this aspect of republicanism. By having to fix “the portion and place of
French Islam to the limits it has attained today” he argues that the French can “accomplish two goals that are equally important and urgent.” Manent
states, that, “vis-a-vis the interior, our internal or common life, we regain the all-important awareness of the fact that the components of the republic
are not only rights-bearing individuals, but groups or associations, temporal and spiritual, with distinct customs and ways of life, whose equilibrium
one is obliged to preserve.” Pierre Manent, “Islam in France,” April 1, 2020, https://lawliberty.org/islam-in-france/?utm_source=LAL+Updates&utm_
campaign=3d72121236-LAL_Daily_Updates&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_53ee3e1605-3d72121236-27220651 (accessed April 10, 2020).
25. James Madison, The Federalist No. 37, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed37.asp (accessed April 13, 2020).
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The Constitution that Madison and Hamilton defended satisfies the
needs of republican liberty primarily through a legislative chamber (House
of Representatives) whose smaller districts and two-year terms ensured
that its numerous Members would be closely bound to their constituents
and thus interested in defending the will of the people. To check this body’s
potential majoritarian excesses, they borrowed from the ancient republics
and devised a senatorial body that would share in legislation. By limiting
Senators to two per state and granting them term lengths of six years, the
smaller American Senate would have institutional incentives to behave
like the aristocratic classes of old while still relying (loosely) on the people
for its authority.26
One can find throughout the Constitution similar efforts to effect this
balance between respecting the will of the majority while protecting against
its power to deprive others of their rights. In the election of the President,
for instance, the Constitution employs the Electoral College, whose electors
are divided up by state and whose numbers are determined by the total
number of representatives each state possesses (House Members plus
Senators). The Electoral College thus balances the wishes of the majority
against respect for the sovereignty of each state, a balance that tries to protect smaller states from their more populous neighbors and prevents the
presidency from becoming the hostage of large urban centers. So too with
the methods for amending and ratifying the Constitution: Both of these
require the support of the majority of the American people to effect, but
they organize and channel the will of the majority through individual state
legislatures, which, again, respects state sovereignty.
Of course, in referring to the sovereignty of states, we are speaking
of federalism, perhaps the most republican innovation of our Founders.
Federalism refers to the division of power between the national and state
governments in which the states get to exercise all of those powers not
specifically delegated to the national government by the Constitution.
The grant of this sphere of sovereign authority is a critical component
of republicanism because it recognizes and protects as legitimate those
diverse interests so necessary to saving our popular regime from the ravages
of factionalism. In other words, federalism, by protecting the sovereignty of
the individual states, ensures that the states will cultivate different spheres

26. The original manner of election to the Senate by state legislators, as required by Art. I, sec. 3 of the U.S. Constitution, removed these representatives
even further from their constituents. On such indirect election, Tocqueville claims that he “will have no difficulty in admitting it; I see in indirect
election the only means to put the use of political liberty within the reach of all classes of the people. Those who hope to make this means the
exclusive weapon of one party, and those who fears this means, seem to me to be equally in error.” Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 321.
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of republican activity reflective of their particular needs, tastes, opinions,
and interests, all of which may differ widely from—and even be at odds
with—those of their neighbors.
As Madison points out, it is precisely the proliferation of communities
bound by such different needs, tastes, opinions, and interests that keeps
the American republic from falling prey to the vices that tore apart ancient
democracies. As factions multiply, they necessarily become smaller in size,
making it harder for any one faction, or even a small coalition of factions, to
act on unjust intentions before more moderate and virtuous fellow citizens
can organize a resistance. Through the innovation of federalism, the republican architects of our political order set up the dynamics for a republican
social order that would, through its very diversity, mitigate the effects of
unjust majority factions and provide a bulwark against a creeping equality
of conditions. And this is where the principle of representation and the
argument for a large and populous nation come together. Only a large and
populous nation can supply the conditions necessary for many factions.
But such a nation, so long as it is popularly based, can only be effectively
governed as a representative republic, not as a direct democracy.
As Madison makes clear in Federalist No. 10, the effort to eliminate
factional differences out of a desire to decrease tension is a fool’s errand.
While American politics would do well to soften the sharp polarization
that characterizes contemporary politics, the oft-stated desire to overcome
all such partisan divisions by creating an elusive political unity would be
exceedingly dangerous. Such a unity is not only at odds with the differences that define political reality, it is at odds with justice; its attainment
would require nothing less than the minority’s sacrifice of its liberty. This
means that one should not hope to eliminate, for instance, the different
and unequal distribution of private property on the basis of which men
form factions and which so thoroughly influences their sense of justice. Nor
should attempts be made to eliminate the formal pillars of republicanism
noted above, mechanisms that promote and protect diversity and prevent
the voice of the majority from being the only voice in American politics.

The Egalitarian Danger of American Democracy
Today, the wisdom behind the balance struck by the Founders through the
institutions of our Constitution is either largely forgotten or derided outright.
The result of such forgetfulness is that we find ourselves in increasing peril of
succumbing to the limitless regard for equality that already animates many
partisans of democracy and that the Founders had hoped to moderate.
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Our love of democracy links contemporary America to its ancient
Athenian predecessor, whose citizens were themselves fanatical about
preserving their access to political power. But Athens, democratic though
it was, was still rife with social and political hierarchies. In their private and
public lives, distinct economic, social, and sexual classes and categories—all
with different rights, responsibilities, and privileges—existed alongside the
political equality enshrined by the democratic regime. The Athenians never
thought to extend the political principle of equality to anything else. But in
America, equality it is not just left to political power; all aspects of human
life fall under the homogenizing influence of our addiction to egalitarianism.
Indeed, the democratic assault on our Constitution’s republican character
does not begin its attack politically. It begins much more subtly, gradually
replacing our taste of and appreciation for distinctions of any kind—be they
within our familial, educational, civic, or religious lives—with a demand,
more powerful by the day, for an equality of outcome.27
Today, this is reflected in the participation trophies handed out at youth
sporting events where everyone “wins” a trophy regardless of whether their
team won or lost—that is, when the parents and coaches even bother to keep
score. After all, acknowledging and thus discriminating between winners
(who get the trophies and the accolades that follow from their victory) and
losers (who do not get such rewards) appears to be an affront to the fundamental equality that defines all individuals under this regime. In order to
spare the losers from the unflattering experience of losing, our attachment
to equality of conditions makes it impossible for anyone to win. While it has
become acceptable at times to criticize the culture of self-esteem that has
saturated primary and secondary education, the American commitment
to this view of equality remains as deep and as powerful as when Tocqueville diagnosed it in the 1830s. That commitment continues to define the
majority opinion that rules over American political, economic, social, and
cultural life.
As Tocqueville observed, the corrosive effects of democratic egalitarianism begin with the social, familial, and religious “forms” that distinguish
human beings from each other. By “forms,” Tocqueville means those customs, ceremonies, and hierarchies that set human beings apart from one
another and regulate their interactions. Americans encounter these forms
or hierarchies in their schools, family rituals, religious observances, and
all social and civic interactions. These forms are built on distinctions or
27. “There is nothing, in my opinion, that merits our attention more than the intellectual and moral associations of America….[They] are as necessary as
the political and industrial ones to the American people, and perhaps more.” Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 902.
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inequalities, for instance, between students and teachers, children and
parents, young and old, citizen and police, and congregation and priest,
and they prescribe codes of behavior for the parties involved. They set
expectations for them, clarifying who is to command and who is to obey,
who is to speak and who is to listen. And in some cases, they dictate the
consequences of failing to observe and uphold them. In other words, forms
establish roles and limits that preserve educational, social, familial, and
religious differences.
Yet Tocqueville sees that among democratic citizens, these forms “excite
their scorn and often their hatred”28 because men “who live in democratic
countries do not easily understand [their] utility…; they feel an instinctive
disdain for them.”29 The acidic effects of this egalitarian imperative on the
forms that long defined social life in America are clear. Democratic habits,
an ethic of familiarity, and egalitarian social, fiscal, and educational policies have erased any meaningful differences between the sexes; denied the
special place reserved under the law for the traditional family; replaced
procreation with the equalizing power of “choice” as the basis of marriage;
flattened economic inequalities between the rich and the poor; treated good
and bad students as equals; and dissolved the difference between citizen and
foreigner. As for religion, especially its Judeo-Christian form, democratic
mockery of it and its preoccupations with the soul has long pushed this
elevating resource to the sidelines of American life.
At every step, the demand for ever more equality homogenizes the
social differences so necessary to our political liberty. And this “temperament,” Tocqueville notes, which a democratic people “bring to political
life, sets them against forms which slow or stop them each day in some of
their desires.”30 The perpetuation of the political institutions designed to
delineate and separate powers from each other at both the national and
state levels requires that we understand the functions and reasons for
those forms, without which we cannot respect or revere them.31 It is in the
absence of this understanding that we witness increasing efforts on behalf
of national referenda in America to do away with the moderating effects
of representation, to override the limits on majoritarianism imposed by
federalism, and to bypass the distinctive interests and needs of our states.

28. Ibid., p. 1270.
29. Ibid., p. 1270.
30. Ibid., p. 1270.
31. On the need for and significance of such reverence, see Abraham Lincoln’s 1838 speech “The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions,” also known as
his Lyceum Address.
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And we see a similar disrespect or ignorance of republican purposes in the
progressive effort to extend or preserve the use of the ballot initiative in
the name of more democracy against state legislatures who, in curbing the
reach of such a measure, seek to recover their representative and deliberative powers.
Unfortunately, these basic civics lessons, once available to almost any
schoolchild, are woefully missing from American high schools and universities.32 And this ignorance of and distaste for political forms does not
just plague America’s youth, who, when they do recognize our republican
institutions, increasingly reject them as outmoded, unrepresentative, and
unresponsive, and who, as a result, seek non-republican alternatives to satisfy their populist desires.33 This even infects our political leaders. In their
embrace of term limits (to restore more electoral control to the people), or
their desire to eliminate the filibuster and expand the size of the Supreme
Court, Members of the U.S. Congress exhibit a kind of egalitarian mania.
They would freely dismiss the forms and practices that organize political
behavior at the federal level and allow our representatives to carry out
responsibly their political charges on behalf of the American people. This
egalitarian zeal even weakens party hierarchies within Congress, as newly
elected Members, like those in the Tea Party a decade ago or “The Squad,”
publicly wrestle with their leadership for legislative control, tossing aside
the traditional deference afforded more seasoned party Members as an
unacceptable delay to the fulfillment of their desires.
The republican form most popularly attacked today, however, is the
Electoral College. In the only truly national election under our Constitution, that of the President, America’s Founders designed several features
to ensure that this election would not be merely democratic. By channeling
the national will through state legislatures and state elections, our Founders
tried to ensure that the selection of the nation’s chief executive would reflect
the interests of the community as a whole and not just the passions of a
handful of large urban centers. Our system (arguably the most innovative
feature of the new constitution) recognizes as legitimate the differences

32. In 2008 and 2011, the Institute for Humane Studies conducted civic literacy tests for over 28,000 college students. The results of these tests indicated
that “the college educated were less civically engaged, less civically knowledgeable, and more liberal than those without a college education. In
fact, self-education in regards to civics and American history trumps a college education in terms of leading to civic engagement.” Christian Tappe,
“American Idiots: A Tale of Two Civic Literacy Studies,” March 22, 2011, Washington Examiner, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/american-idiotsa-tale-of-two-civic-literacy-studies (accessed April 30, 2020).
33. Sean Kates, Jonathan M. Ladd, and Joshua A. Tucker, “New Poll Shows Dissatisfaction with American Democracy, Especially Among the Young,”
Vox, October 31, 2018, https://www.vox.com/mischiefs-of-faction/2018/10/31/18042060/poll-dissatisfaction-american-democracy-young (accessed
April 8, 2020).
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between different regions of the country and provides them with the electoral avenues for expressing and preserving those differences. This is the
heart of republican self-government.
And yet today the effort to circumvent this aspect of our presidential
system proceeds apace. Under the banner of making “every vote count,”
the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC)34 “compels” the
state legislatures that have passed it into law to give their slate of electors
to the candidate who received the most votes nationwide regardless of how
the majority of the people in that state voted. The NPVIC thus circumvents
the republican effects of the Electoral College. As with national referenda,
it rejects the sovereignty of the states, the legitimacy of their differences,
and the view that such differences merit special electoral avenues and protections. In the name of “making every vote count,” the NPVIC denies to
voters the right to think that the different vistas afforded by our country’s
regional diversity might offer new and valuable perspectives on our country’s welfare. The only voice that counts is that of the majority. In silencing
those outside the majority, it advances the equality of conditions in America.
Given that America’s Founders developed numerous non- and counter-majoritarian institutions to mitigate the rule of unchecked majorities,
how does all of this happen? How can a country so consciously dedicated
to republican principles become so addicted to democracy that it reduces
the former to the latter? Tocqueville declares that the “social state of the
Americans is eminently democratic”;35 and the “very essence of democratic
government is that the dominion of the majority be absolute; for in democracies, nothing outside the majority can offer resistance.”36 In America, this
nearly god-like deference to the majority stems in part from the “theory of
equality applied to minds.”37 Tocqueville writes that the “moral dominion
of the majority is based in part on the idea that there is more enlightenment
and wisdom in many men combined than in one man alone, more in the
number than in the choice of legislators.”38
The logic at work in the heart of modern democracy here is deceptively simple. All human beings are fundamentally equal: When it comes

34. Currently, 15 state legislatures and the District of Columbia, representing 196 electoral votes, have joined this “compact.” “National Popular Vote,”
https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/ (accessed March 3, 2020). That states whose electoral fortunes will be harmed by joining the NPVIC have
done so without opposition or even much public discussion, testifies to the power of our unreflective commitment to egalitarianism.
35. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 75.
36. Ibid., p. 403.
37. Ibid., p. 404.
38. Ibid., p. 404.

FIRST PRINCIPLES | No. 80
heritage.org



to knowing how we ought to live our lives, no single individual possesses
more wisdom than anyone else. This equality and the claim on which it rests
are moral imperatives of modern democracy. To reject or question them
is to court not merely error, but vice; it is to risk the moral opprobrium of
one’s fellow citizens. As such, these imperatives must be accepted without
question by democracy’s partisans. Once they are accepted, it follows that
the truth about any question of political significance must reside with the
majority. For if all minds are equal, then the view held by the majority of
individual minds is most likely the correct one; the individual by himself
has no grounds on which he can question it.
Of course, citizens in democracy do recognize that some individuals are
smarter than others. But this generous exception tends to be limited to the
kind of rarified knowledge supplied by advanced education and training in
the physical and technological sciences. In the contemporary democratic
view, those who possess more technical knowledge and expertise than
others in these fields (reflected in their appropriate credentials of course)
are owed obedience on matters related to their expertise. But such “obedience” has implications for our common social and political lives. And as
the experience with COVID-19 shows, “experts” can often disagree and the
so-called scientific consensus on a given issue can drastically change, sometimes quite rapidly, bringing with it vacillations in policy. In these cases,
the democratic approach to intellect finds itself increasingly incapable of
evaluating conflicting policies advocated by those whose knowledge and
training they admittedly lack. And this is because the democratic theory
applied to minds does not recognize a hierarchy of human knowledge in
which scientific expertise is governed and regulated by prudential political
judgments, themselves drawn from an understanding of the political good.
Because republicanism does not simply defer to the views of the majority,
it is better positioned to appreciate the political wisdom made available by
non- and counter-majoritarian sources. In preserving these sources and in its
respect for the moral and intellectual inequalities that define political reality,
republicanism makes possible a more capacious intellectual platform whereby
the public good can come into view in light of which we can evaluate the policy
implications of competing scientific findings. Republicanism embraces the
intellectual inequality that is so anathema to modern democracies.
But republicanism in America has a difficulty countering the logic of
modern democracy. The logic of modern democracy does not just help identify wherein lies the “truth.” It takes its original moral command regarding
the equality of individuals and amplifies it, creating in the process a new and
outsized moral power whose axioms cannot be challenged. For once you
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accept the moral equality of all men as individuals, and once you agree that
the majority of equally capable minds added together equals the truth, then
the majority view necessarily assumes a new and towering moral bearing.
Whereas the equality of individuals in its original meaning prevented one
man from ruling over others, keeping everyone free from the oppression of
one another, the adding up of those individual wills into a majority creates
an entirely new power, one that is justly allowed to rule over anyone and
everyone, especially those who do not share its views. Ironically, what it
would zealously deny to one man, modern democracy freely gives to the
majority. Through this sleight of hand, the majority becomes the “all.”
Democracy in America thus works by a bizarre kind of political math
in which the process of adding up individual wills doesn’t issue in a “sum”
but a “product”; that is, democracy uses arithmetic to multiply. And yet
how it does this, how modern democracy uses arithmetic to do the job of
multiplication, is never accurately explained by partisans of democracy. In
many cases, this subtle shift is not even acknowledged, let alone reflected on,
even by those theorists of modern democracy who populate the academy
today.39 And this blind-spot to democracy’s conflation of “the many” with
“the all” is made all the more inexcusable by the majority’s uneven record
on human rights in American history, from its original support of slavery,
to its opposition of women’s rights to vote, to its reluctance to embrace
the civil rights movement, among others. In other words, the consensus
of the majority today, which is so ready to denounce all of those injustices
committed and embraced by earlier democratic majorities, continues to
promote the view that the will of the majority should be the supreme locus
of political legitimacy. In the face of clear historical iniquities perpetrated
or supported by a majority of American citizens, the defenders of majoritarianism do not rethink their commitment to the infallibility of the majority.
Unfortunately, American democracy does not cultivate within its citizens
the kind of character willing to stand against the majority. As a result, the
principle of equality so deeply cherished by the majority is never examined
with care. To be sure, America today suffers from a profoundly polarized
39. Perhaps the most visible example of the effort to rationalize democratic majorities can be found among defenders of deliberative democracy, an
academic discipline that seeks to ground the legitimacy of majority rule through the deliberative processes by which democratic individuals form
majorities. The foundations of this approach were laid by John Rawls in his A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971) and
Political Liberalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), and by Jürgen Habermas’s A Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the
Rationalization of Society, Vol. 1, trans. by Thomas McCarthy (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1985). Subsequent influential defenses of this valorization of
majority rule can be found in the work of Amy Gutman and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1996); Joseph M. Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1994); and Seyla Benhabib, “Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy,” in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the
Boundaries of The Political, Seyla Benhabib, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
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politics. There is no shortage of debate over economic, racial, and gender
inequalities, no absence of “wars” over abortion or same-sex marriage or
immigrant rights. But, as intense as they may be, when viewed from the
perspective of our foundational principles, these disagreements are epiphenomenal. They do not get at the common principles that Americans cherish
and accept unthinkingly. No one today seriously questions the value of
democratic equality or whether the will of the majority should rule. Those
who do manage to question the judgment of the majority frequently find
themselves “canceled,” that is, publicly shunned and professionally silenced.
To the extent that we publicly disagree with one another then, our disagreements revolve around means and implementation; we fight over the proper
meaning of equality and how to achieve it (not its fundamental goodness
or desirability) or over how to register and effect the majority’s wishes (not
whether majorities should rule). Not even those with the greatest incentive
to criticize the majority, the losers of elections in America, do so. These men
and women will blame anyone or anything else—the media, their opponents,
the economy, their staffs, even themselves—for their losses before thinking
of criticizing the wisdom and good will of the American majority.
As a result of all of this, the majority is allowed to live in a state of perpetual self-adoration.40 It recognizes no power above it with the authority
to correct it.41 As Tocqueville writes, democratic citizens “have an ardent,
insatiable, eternal, invincible passion for equality; they want equality in
liberty, and if they cannot obtain that, they still want equality in slavery.
They will suffer poverty, enslavement, barbarism, but they will not suffer
aristocracy”—or inequality.42 And because the limits of human nature make
it impossible to raise everyone up to the highest level (most human beings
cannot become a Socrates, a Newton, a Mozart), the desire for equality can
only be satisfied by bringing everyone down.43 Again, Tocqueville notes that:
in the human heart a depraved taste for equality is also found that leads the
weak to want to bring the strong down to their level and that reduces men to
preferring equality in servitude to inequality in liberty.44

40. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 419.
41. “So men who live during these times of equality are not easily led to place the intellectual authority to which they submit outside and above humanity
they will readily scoff at new prophets and that they will want to find the principal arbiter of their beliefs within the limits of humanity and not
beyond.” Tocqueville, Democracy in America, p. 717.
42. Ibid., p. 878.
43. This insight is captured with marvelous clarity and humor in the 1961 short story “Harrison Bergeron” by Kurt Vonnegut.
44. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, pp. 89–90.
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For such a people,
liberty is not the principal and constant object of their desire; what they love
with undying love is equality; they rush toward liberty by rapid impulses and
sudden efforts, and if they miss the goal, they resign themselves; but without
equality nothing can satisfy them, and rather than lose it, they would agree to
perish.45

If unchecked, these passions, so strongly animating a democratic people,
can destroy the republican institutions that are its remaining hopes to
maintain its political liberty.

What Is Next and What Are We to Do?
As Americans seem to increasingly embrace the notion that our country
and its institutions need to become more democratic to fulfill the promise
of the Constitution, more efforts to extend the principle of equality to all
aspects of American social and cultural life can be expected. The drive to
eliminate all racial, gender, and economic inequalities will be felt more
keenly, and the culture wars over immigrant rights, same-sex marriage, and
identity politics will continue to deepen, as advocates for greater equality
hunt for new differences that they can rally around in order to crush.
For example, progressives are waging even greater efforts to emancipate
children—the final frontier in the cause of equality—from the oppressive
strictures of their parents and family life so that children can live their lives
as the fully authentic selves they supposedly conceive themselves to be. And
in American higher education, the principle of differentiation, the one distinguishing good students from bad, high achievement from low, is coming
under attack in the name of greater equality. Daniel Markovits, the Guido
Calabressi professor of law at Yale University, thus calls for universities to
free themselves from “the meritocratic inequality that now ensnares them,”
so they can “pursue whatever values they hold dear, crafting admissions
standards that favor community service, or academic scholarship, or hardwork, or a thousand other virtues. The elite would become less exclusive,
but much more free.”46

45. Ibid., pp. 89–90.
46. Daniel Markovits, “American Universities Must Choose: Do They Want to Be Equal or Elite?,” Time, September 12, 2019, https://time.com/5676174/
universities-equality-eliteness/ (accessed April 6, 2020).
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And with this cultural push for more equality, we can expect to see more
vocal attacks on all of those instruments designed to temper the will of the
majority, to inject greater deliberations into our decisions, and to preserve
the distinctive voices and interests of the American people. The efforts to
eliminate the Senatorial filibuster, to impose term-limits on Members of the
U.S. Congress, to push for more referenda at the state and national level, and,
of course, to abolish or circumvent the Electoral College will thus continue
apace. We are also likely to see a push to increase voter participation in
communal decisions by greater use of technology. Various forms of digital
democracy, or e-democracy as it is sometimes called, are already used by
democratic countries throughout the West for everything from filing taxes
to making communal budgetary decisions to voting in national referenda
and elections. And given that the current pandemic is not likely the last
we will face, we can expect to see digital democracy advocated as the publicly responsible way to effectively express the electoral will of the people.
While critics have pointed out the numerous dangers posed by this use of
technology, its “democratic” defenders have responded that many of these
problems can be addressed through increased governmental control over
social media and regulation of the internet.
Those concerned with defending America’s republican character and
the liberties it makes possible can take some solace in the fact that many
of the resources necessary to defend our political institutions are already
at our disposal. And Tocqueville, who first diagnosed the equality of conditions that threatens our republic, highlighted those fundamental aspects of
American life critical to maintaining our republican freedom.
According to Tocqueville, the preservation of our freedom from the tyranny of a democratic majority requires, among other things, the taste for
freedom and self-government that comes from experiences such as jury
duty and participation in local civil associations, robust religious belief, and
the maintenance of the traditional family. Of course, resurrecting these
in the midst of our egalitarian excesses requires cultivating once again
an appreciation for difference and inequality, and chiefly an inequality
of intellect that is at the heart of republicanism and anathema to pure or
direct democracy.
If we fail to cultivate this respect for intellectual superiority, then any
efforts to defend republican forms, like the filibuster or the Electoral College,
or to promote voluntary associations or defend vibrant religious practice
critical to our freedom, will be the political equivalent of “whack-a-mole.”
Of course, cultivating this taste requires an encounter with the kind
of thought that is freed from our egalitarian distortions. That means that
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Americans, and younger Americans especially, need to be exposed to literature that is neither modern nor democratic. Tocqueville highlights the
virtues of the kind of “aristocratic literature” found among the ancient
Greek and Roman authors, such as Plutarch, whom he read closely, or Polybius, Cicero, and Livy, whom members of our founding generation read.
Such authors, Tocqueville tells us, “always demonstrated an admirable art
and care in details; nothing in their works seems done in haste or by chance;
everything is written for connoisseurs, and the search for ideal beauty is
shown constantly.”47 These “special qualities” can “serve marvelously to
counterbalance our particular defects.”48
How can such “aristocratic literature” counterbalance our particularly
democratic defects? It is not about making democratic citizens of all stripes
more lettered or more schooled in the arts of rhetoric. It is about cultivating
the kind of republican character that only comes from the peculiar thoughtfulness made possible by such literature. In other words, our contemporary
egalitarian ethos, in seeking to apply a single, uniform view of justice to
all aspects of American social, familial, religious, economic, and political
life, approaches inequality and difference as if they were problems in need
of permanent solution. The imposition of ever more equality as a “onesize-fits-all” answer to the constantly shifting needs of political life thus
approaches political challenges as though they were algebraic equations:
problems that can be settled once-and-for-all so that we can move on to
bask in the “sunlit uplands” of our perfectly egalitarian community.49
But America’s Founders understood that the demands of political liberty
and the realities of political life do not admit of such settled utopianism.
In fact, the heterogeneous character of justice, as Aristotle showed, would
require a much more flexible political order, one capable of addressing and
managing the constantly shifting needs, passions, and interests of its distinctive parts, such that any solution it might devise would only constitute an
incomplete and temporary remedy. In other words, informed by their own
experience with both practical politics and the “aristocratic literature” of
the Western political tradition, the authors of the Federalist Papers understood that there could be no perfect or permanent solution to the constant
demands that political justice and liberty make of a republican citizenry.

47. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, pp. 816-817.
48. Ibid., p. 817.
49. For a wonderful treatment of the problems posed by this “algebraic” approach to human and political problems and the role played by the “Great
Books” of the Western intellectual tradition in remedying that problem, see Leon Kass’s chapter “The Aims of Liberal Education: On Seeking Truth,” in
his Leading a Worthy Life: Finding Meaning in Modern Times (New York: Encounter Books, 2017).
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What such men did have, and what we need today, is less of an algebraic
approach to politics and more of an intellectual disposition capable of living
with uncertainty and irresolution, a disposition that is at home with the
persistence of political problems and questions. The kind of thoughtfulness
and disposition developed by the “aristocratic literature” to which Tocqueville alludes produces the sober temperament necessary to our republican
government. The artistry of this literature resists the crass effort to reduce
its insights to simple axioms, and its fidelity to human nature reminds us
of the limits to what can be achieved in political life. Of course, the job of
preserving and perpetuating the intellectual inequality of “aristocratic literature” falls to our colleges and universities. Given the contemporary decline
of the humanities in the American academy, where the serious study of such
literature used to be found, pessimism about the prospects of recovering
a healthy respect for the intellectual inequality so necessary to republican
freedom might well be justified. But given what is at stake—“a republic, if
we can keep it,” to paraphrase Benjamin Franklin’s legendary quip—the
fight must go on.
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